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 2  Hermeneutics and Nature 
 Dalia  Nassar 
 Over the last few years, historians of science have turned their 
attention to the ways in which the study of history, human 
languages and cultures infl uenced the development of various 
natural- scientifi c disciplines. 1 Two claims have emerged from this 
research: the fi rst is a critique of previous histories of science, which 
anachronistically applied the late nineteenth- century division of the 
 Naturwissenschaften and the  Geisteswissenschaften onto earlier 
centuries, and thereby overlooked the mutual infl uence the two 
fi elds exerted on one another. 2 The second is that it was primarily 
the methodological practices and insights of the humanistic discip-
lines that infl uenced certain natural- scientifi c fi elds. 3 
 Although this work has been largely focused on Renaissance 
and Early Modern scientifi c practices , 4 recent scholarship on the 
eighteenth century has become increasingly attuned to the need to 
investigate the role of the natural sciences in the development of 
key fi elds of the humanities . 5 This is most evident in studies on the 
rise of historicism, which have (at least) noted the role that natural 
history played in the development of the historical study of human 
cultures . 6 The same does not hold for research into the emergence of 
modern hermeneutics, arguably the human science par excellence. 7 
This might be due to the fact that most studies of hermeneutics 
focus on (or begin with) the nineteenth century, and thus largely 
assume Dilthey’s distinction between the human and the natural 
sciences . 8 Alternately, or additionally, it might have to do with the 
fact that one of the most infl uential voices in twentieth- century her-
meneutics, Gadamer, criticizes the natural sciences for overlooking 
their situatedness, and in so doing overlooks the possibility that 
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pre- positivist (i.e., eighteenth century) natural science may have 
infl uenced the emergence of hermeneutics. 9 
 Whatever the reason, it is perhaps telling that research focusing 
on the eighteenth century, in contrast to more general work on her-
meneutics, has recognized the role of the natural sciences in the 
emergence of the study of interpretation. 10 However, these studies, 
along with the work on historicism, have interpreted the relation-
ship as uni- directional:  the natural sciences infl uenced the rise of 
historicism and hermeneutics. But is it possible that the infl uence 
was bi- directional – that hermeneutics was not only infl uenced by 
natural history but that it also infl uenced certain aspects of the study 
of nature, leading to new insights and discoveries? Could the study 
of nature in the late eighteenth century have involved hermeneutic 
methods and insights that ultimately transformed the ways in which 
we approach and represent the natural world? 
 To answer this question, I  will consider the relationship 
between hermeneutics and natural science in the eighteenth century, 
focusing on three fi gures, Buffon, Diderot, and Herder. Though Kant 
has been recognized as developing something like a hermeneutics 
of nature in the  Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) – through 
refl ective judging and the idea of life 11   – these thinkers developed 
the notion of an interpretation of nature well before Kant (such that 
many of Kant’s key claims are already present in their work), and they 
were able to integrate the hermeneutic method into their study of 
nature more coherently than Kant ever did or was able to do. 12 After 
all, unlike Buffon, Diderot, and Herder, Kant remained wedded to the 
idea of science as founded on mathematics, 13 such that he could not 
agree with the “liberalization” of science that took place in the mid- 
eighteenth century, which led to the introduction of new modes of 
knowledge into scientifi c research. 14 My claim then is that the emer-
gence of a hermeneutics of nature must be understood in light of this 
liberalization of science, heralded by Buffon, designated by Diderot, 
and carried out most comprehensively by Herder. As I  will argue, 
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it was Herder’s new methodology – developed for the interpretation 
of historical texts and authors  – that furnished the most concrete 
response to a key problem facing both Buffon and Diderot and that 
offered signifi cant insights that resulted in the development of a new, 
dynamic natural history and geography. 15 
 THE EIGHTEENTH- CENTURY LANDSCAPE 
 In 1735 Linnaeus placed the human being in the class “quadruped” 
and created the anthropomorphic order, which included monkeys, 
lizards, and sloths. The reasoning for this was that they all shared 
the same arrangement of teeth. Buffon, among others, considered 
this to be both arbitrary and far too narrow a way by which to draw 
classifi cations. Linnaeus’s classifi cation, he argues in the  Histoire 
naturelle (1749−1804), is based on “a metaphysical error.” He writes:
 it is easy to see that the great fault in all of this is a metaphysical 
error … in wanting to judge a whole by only one of its parts: a 
very obvious error, and one that is surprisingly found everywhere; 
for almost all of the classifi ers have employed only one part, 
such as teeth, claws, or talons, to classify animals, and leaves 
or fl owers to categorize plants, instead of using all of the 
parts, looking for the differences and similarities in the entire 
individual thing. 16 
 By confusedly taking the part for the whole, by narrowly focusing on 
one aspect of an animal’s or plant’s structure without taking account 
of the “entire individual thing,” Linnaeus’s system imposed abstract 
categories onto nature, which had little or nothing to do with nature 
itself. Thus Buffon contends, “that way of knowing is not a science, 
it is only a convention, an arbitrary language.” 17 
 In light of his critique of abstraction and convention, Buffon 
introduced the distinction between “physical” and “abstract” truth. 
One kind of abstract truth, he argued, is mathematical truth, insofar 
as it is an invention of the human mind. Physical truths, by contrast, 
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are real; they exist in the natural world and are the proper object of 
human inquiry. 18 
 Buffon’s emphasis on real or physical truths led him to a new, 
historicized conception of species and of nature more generally. In 
the place of Linnaeus’s arbitrary classifi cations, Buffon argued that 
natural history must be concerned with “real” relations, which can 
only be discerned through historical insight. Thus, he writes,
 [natural] history must follow description, and must solely 
center around the relations which natural things have among 
themselves and with us: the history of an animal must not be the 
history of the individual, but that of the whole species; it must 
treat their generation … the number of their young, the care of 
their parents … their place of habitation, their food … and fi nally 
the services they can render us. 19 
 In other words, in order to overcome the abstract systems of tax-
onomy, it is necessary to reconceive natural history: natural history 
must consider a species in relation to its context, and, most import-
antly, regard it not as a static (eternal) entity, but as the continu-
ation of a group of individuals (in time) through reproduction. 20 In 
one stroke, Buffon offered a new defi nition of species, historicized 
nature, and redefi ned natural history. 
 In the  Histoire naturelle Buffon identifi ed a difficulty with 
his approach, one that has to do with the difference between the 
way in which our intellect operates and the way in which nature 
operates. Our intellect proceeds linearly, taking only single steps 
in one direction. Nature, by contrast, “does not take a single step 
except to go in all directions; in marching forward, she extends to 
the sides and above.” 21 With this apparent incongruity between the 
mind and nature, the question arises as to how it is possible to glean 
any unity in nature’s infi nite multiplicity. Lacking a priori theoret-
ical foundations, it is not evident how natural history can capture 
nature’s diversity in a coherent or meaningful way. 
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 It was precisely this question that Diderot posed in his  Pensées 
sur l’interprétation de la Nature (1753/ 1754 22 ). Like Buffon, Diderot 
was deeply critical of the mathematical and a priorist methodologies 
of his predecessors, writing that “the domain of mathematicians is 
a world purely of the intellect, where what are taken for absolute 
truths cease entirely to be so when applied to the world we live in.” 23 
Nonetheless, Diderot notes that lacking mathematical or a priori 
foundations, it appears impossible to achieve unity in natural his-
tory, such that “[e] ven if experimental science continued to work 
for century after century, the materials which it accumulated would 
eventually have become too great to fi t into any system, and the 
inventory of them would still be far from complete.” 24 
 For Buffon and Diderot the solution to this dilemma is found 
in analogy and comparative analysis. 25 Thus Buffon writes in the 
 Histoire naturelle :
 This goal is the most important one … to combine observations, 
to generalize about facts, to tie them together by the force of 
analogy [ par la force de l’analogie ], and to try to arrive at this 
high degree of knowledge where we can judge that particular 
effects depend on more general effects, where we can compare 
nature with herself in her great operations, and from where we 
can fi nally open up the paths that will permit us to perfect the 
different parts of physics. 26 
 Natural history requires analogy because it is only through com-
paring various structures that we can begin to discern similarities 
and recognize differences between species. Thus in his account of 
anatomy, Buffon notes that it was not until anatomists began to com-
pare human and animal bodies that any knowledge was achieved. 
For, he explains, “What real knowledge can be derived from a single 
object? Is not every science founded on the comparison of similar and 
different objects, of their analogous or opposite properties, and of all 
their relative qualities? Absolute knowledge, if it has an existence, 
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exceeds the powers of man:  we can only judge by the relations of 
things.” 27 
 By discerning similarities and differences, analogy provides a 
means by which to grasp continuity in nature  – real relations – that 
are not based on just one structural similarity, or an a priori tax-
onomy. Such an analogically  based account of nature differs, however, 
from a systematic account founded on mathematical construction 
or axiomatic demonstration. For one, it necessarily remains open to 
being corrected – analogical inference may be wrong. Furthermore, it 
cannot establish certainty  – analogical inference achieves probability 
only. 28 
 The road to the “interpretation of nature,” as Diderot put it, 
was opened. The use of analogy implied that the study of nature 
could not yield certain, eternal knowledge, but it also implied that 
natural history was not and cannot be the mere accumulation of 
disconnected facts. Rather, natural history must involve observation 
guided by a literary tool  – analogy  – in order to discern similarity 
and difference. In other words, the way to resolve Diderot’s problem 
was to invoke a literary device in order to “interpret” nature. The 
natural scientist, as John Zammito has noted, became more than an 
 observateur of nature (Bacon); she was now an  interprète of nature. 29 
In the  Pensées , however, Diderot did not provide a detailed account 
of the methodology of the interpretation of nature. Though Buffon 
provided insights into overcoming this difficulty, he too did not fur-
nish a comprehensive methodology. It was Herder who, through his 
 new methodology of hermeneutics, provided the fi rst comprehensive 
“interpretation of nature.” 
 HERDER AND BUFFON 
 Herder was familiar with Buffon, and makes ample reference to him 
throughout his writings. 30 He was, furthermore, sympathetic to many 
of Buffon’s ideas: Buffon’s critique of a priorism and mathematical- 
universalist accounts of nature; his claim that human history must 
be considered part of natural history; and his critique of abstraction 
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in science. However, Herder’s attitude toward Buffon was, as John 
Zammito notes, mixed. 31 Herder worries that Buffon was not able 
to achieve his aims, because he remained tied to the prejudices of 
his age. For although Buffon sought to develop a concrete, holistic 
account of the natural world – an account that is not focused on one 
aspect of an organism’s structure – his tendency was to analyze and 
distinguish, rather than synthesize and unify. 
 In his study of Thomas Abbt, Herder distinguishes Buffon as 
the anti- systematic thinker who is needed to combat the likes of 
Linnaeus in the study of the human spirit. Thus, he writes, “when 
our systematic philosophers become  Linnaeus in the study of the 
mind, classifying according to their own principles [ eigensinnig ], 
then an unsystematic mind, like  Buffon , must be placed alongside 
them … in order to analyze the individuals” (FHA 2, 572). 32 
 While this statement appears sympathetic, it also harbors 
Herder’s worry about Buffon, namely Buffon’s apparent tendency to 
dissect and analyze without fi nding a way by which to synthesize. 
This worry is clearly expressed in Herder’s 1772 prize essay on the 
origin of language, where he places Buffon alongside Condillac and 
Bonnet, and criticizes all three for their failure to unify what they 
have dissected. Herder writes:  “All dissections of sensation in the 
case of  Buffon’s, Condillac’s , and  Bonnet’s sensing human being are 
abstractions; the philosopher has to neglect one thread of sensation 
in pursuing the other, but in nature all these threads are a single 
web!” (HPW 107). 33 Although Herder is here specifi cally concerned 
with their respective accounts of human psychology and physiology, 
his critique obtains for what he sees as a general tendency in Buffon’s 
approach. Though Buffon  intends to offer a holistic account of the 
natural world, his efforts are not fully realized. This can be seen in 
Buffon’s account of “climate,” and in Herder’s transformation of this 
(somewhat superfi cial) conception into a key methodological tool for 
natural history (and ultimately geography ). 
 Buffon introduces the notion of climate, alongside nourish-
ment, in order to account for differences among animal species and 
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among humans. 34 By climate, Buffon implies primarily temperature 
but also geography. 35 Speaking of horses, he remarks that “studs kept 
in dry light soils produce active, nimble, and vigorous horses, with 
nervous limbs and strong hoofs; while those kept in moist ground, 
and in too rich pasturage, have generally large heavy heads, gross 
bodies, thick legs, bad hoofs, and broad feet. It is easy to perceive,” 
Buffon concludes, “that these differences proceed from the varieties 
in climate and food.” 36 
 Climate and nourishment are thus regarded as the ultimate 
causes of differences within species. This is evident, for instance, in 
Buffon’s claim that variation in human skin color is due to, on the one 
hand, the climatic zone a human inhabits, and, on the other, the infl u-
ence of food. 37 In contrast to Buffon’s two categories, Herder contends 
that “it is much more the case that a large storehouse of other forces, 
both disadvantageous and advantageous, are connected to us” (FHA 
6, 265). Though Herder does not specifi cally point to Buffon here, this 
statement resounds with his earlier critique of Buffon’s tendency to 
dissect. The claim is that Buffon  – despite his efforts – was unable 
to follow nature’s many directions, along a non- linear path, and fi nd 
unity therein. In his emphasis on just two categories, Buffon remains 
one- sided in his analysis; he does not account for the complexity and 
multi- directionality of nature’s (many) “forces.” 38 
 In contrast to Buffon’s climate and nourishment, Herder 
develops the notion of a “world” or a “circle,” which aims to rec-
ognize and encompass multiple essential aspects of a natural (and 
cultural) environment, the relations between these aspects, the ways 
in which these aspects refl ect and are refl ected in individuals and 
species, and most importantly, the ways in which these various 
aspects form an integrated unity. Working with analogies, Herder, 
like Buffon, aims to discern similarities among the multiplicity of 
natural phenomena. However, through the notion of a world, Herder 
extends his use of analogy beyond a one- to- one comparison (i.e., com-
paring the structure of one species or variety to another in light of 
a specifi c natural phenomenon, such as heat). For, as we shall see, 
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the idea of a world implies a multiplicity of factors  – a “chaos of 
causes and effects” (FHA 6, 266) – and their co- determination. Herder 
invokes the notion of a world in order to follow nature’s many paths 
and discern unity in the multiplicity. How does Herder arrive at this 
idea of a world, and how does he apply it to resolve Buffon’s and 
Diderot’s dilemma? I  will begin with the fi rst question, and argue 
that although Herder introduces the notion of a world in the prize 
essay on language, it was in his preceding writings on the interpret-
ation of historical individuals and texts that he developed the idea. 
 HERDER’S HERMENEUTICS 
 Herder’s hermeneutics, like Buffon’s methodology, is critical of 
a priori theories of interpretation. In their place Herder develops a 
theory of interpretation that employs a bottom- up approach that 
seeks to grasp the particularity of a culture, and understand it from 
within (FHA 1, 97). As he puts it in  This Too a Philosophy of History 
(1774), “every nation has its own center of well- being with itself, just 
as every globe has it center of gravity” and the task of the interpreter 
is to grasp precisely this center (FHA 4, 39). The question thus is: how 
is an interpreter to grasp the “center” of a culture long gone, or dis-
cern the “center” of a text or work of art? What, in other words, are 
the methods that the historian or interpreter must invoke in order to 
achieve this kind of knowledge? 
 Well before his writings on the philosophy of history, Herder 
had begun to consider these questions in relation to biography and 
the interpretation of works of art. In the essay on Thomas Abbt, 
Herder’s concern is with how he  – as the biographer of Abbt  – is 
to approach his subject in the right way. For Herder the right way 
involves recognizing both Abbt’s individuality  and his indebtedness 
to his time and culture. As Herder puts it, “most of all it is necessary 
to distill [ abzieht ] what belongs to  the author’s time or to the  past 
world , and what he leaves over for  the world of posterity . He bears 
the chains of his age, to which he offers his book as a gift; he stands 
in his century like a tree in the realm of earth into which it has 
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driven its roots, from which it draws nourishing juices, with which it 
covers its originating members” (FHA 2, 579; HPW 172, translation 
modifi ed). The natural imagery serves to elaborate Herder’s point: an 
author, like a tree, is not born isolated; rather, both are dependent 
on the surroundings, the climate and the geography, into which they 
are born. They become what they are only in relation to this larger 
context. The aim of the interpreter (like the natural historian) must 
therefore be to discern  the individuality or  distinctness of an author 
(of a species)  within her culture (within the natural environment), 
and not beyond or above it. Thus, Herder continues, whoever wishes 
to rob the author of the “birthmarks of his time,” risks “taking from 
him the traits of his individuality [ Eigenheiten ]” (FHA 2, 579; HPW 
172). An author neither exists nor can be understood outside of her or 
his cultural framework; it is this framework that enables the author 
to write, to become an author. The framework, then, is not some-
thing artifi cially imposed, nor is it a hindrance to understanding; 
rather, it must be taken into account in order to discern the author’s 
distinctive contribution or individuality. 
 This means that the interpreter must, fi rst, avoid any a priori 
generalizations about the author or the work: given that the author is 
born in a specifi c time and place, one cannot make any presumptions 
about her work or aims without fi rst investigating the particularities 
into which she is born. The interpreter must, however, also avoid 
sinking into particularities and failing to fi nd a “center,” a mean-
ingful and coherent unity in light of which the author’s work is to 
be interpreted. Thus, just like the historian of nature, so the inter-
preter must avoid both abstraction and the mere accumulation of 
data; the interpreter must fi nd a way to grasp the particular and fi nd 
signifi cance, coherence  therein . This means, importantly, that the 
interpreter’s aim is not to regard the author as a mere refl ection of 
the mores of her time and place; rather, by seeking to discern the 
author’s individuality within her context, the interpreter’s aim is 
to discern how the author is a participant in and a contributor to 
her context. As such, Herder’s conception of unity (context) is not 
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of an undifferentiated or homogenous whole, but of an internally 
differentiated one, composed of the individual contributions of its 
various members, whose contributions are themselves dependent 
on this unity, this context. There is, in other words, a reciprocity 
at work here, such that neither the whole nor the parts can exist 
without the other. 
 In the essay on Abbt, Herder explains that the means by which 
to achieve the goal of interpretation is by explaining “one in terms 
of the other [ eins aus dem andern erkläret ],” i.e., by seeing how the 
context is refl ected in the individual author’s work, and how the 
individual author’s work adds to, or challenges aspects of, this con-
text (FHA 2, 575; HPW 171). It is only by seeing one (the author) 
through the other (her age) that their similarities and differences 
come to light. 39 In this way, Herder extends analogical refl ection, 
beyond a one- on- one comparison, to encompass the world that the 
author inhabits and which inhabits the author (the relation, as we 
have seen, is reciprocal). This extension is demonstrated in Herder’s 
own hermeneutic practice, and can be seen, for instance, in his essay 
on Shakespeare (1773; draft 1771). 
 In the essay, Herder challenges French views of theater, which 
take Aristotle’s understanding of tragedy as foundational for aes-
thetic judgment, in order to demonstrate their mistaken interpret-
ation of Shakespeare. The trouble with the French approach, Herder 
notes, is that it fails to recognize that the world out of which Greek 
tragedy emerged fundamentally differs from Shakespeare’s world. 
“In Greece,” Herder contends, “the drama developed in a way that it 
could not in the north. In Greece it was what it can never be in the 
north. In the north it is not and cannot be what it was in Greece” 
(FHA 2, 499; SWA 292). 40 After all, he continues, “as everything in 
the world changes, so Nature, the true creator of Greek drama, was 
bound to change also.  The Greek worldview, manners, the state of 
the republics, the tradition of the heroic age, religion, even  music, 
expression, and  the degrees of illusion changed” (FHA 2, 503; SWA 
294). Thus, to judge Shakespeare according to the rules of Greek 
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drama is not only problematic, but also absurd. A work of art is, like 
a writer, of its time, such that its appropriateness, its “genius,” can 
only be measured and determined in relation to its time. 
 Herder begins his interpretation of Shakespeare by noting gen-
eral differences between ancient Greek drama and Shakespeare’s, 
differences that are fundamentally connected to their respective 
worldviews. In ancient Greece there was an overarching sense of 
unity of time and place, as well as a sense of simplicity among the 
Greek people and their polity. One can say that the Greeks lacked 
a modern sense of history and of cultural differences. This was, 
Herder contends, refl ected in their dramatic works (most, though 
not all, of Greek drama occurred in one place, for instance). By 
contrast, Shakespeare’s world is one composed of “a rich variety 
of different estates, ways of life, convictions, peoples and idioms – 
any nostalgia for the simplicity of former times would have been 
in vain” (FHA 2, 508; SWA 298). For this reason his works do not 
occur in one place, but move from one location to the next, and 
involve people from a variety of backgrounds. It is also for this 
reason, Herder continues, that for Shakespeare plot no longer held 
the meaning the Greeks had bestowed upon it (i.e., a single action), 
but came to mean “event ” or “great occurrence.” Ultimately, in 
Shakespeare’s works we witness transitions and movements that 
are simply not present in Greek drama, and this is a refl ection of the 
world that Shakespeare inhabits. 
 Furthermore, Herder notes that ancient Greek drama was a 
public institution  and a religious event, while Shakespearean drama 
did not have religious motivations (FHA 2, 516; SWA 304; see also 
SW 16, 101). 41 This means that the  aim of a Greek drama differed 
from that of a Shakespearean drama, and it is only in light of this 
difference of aim that either can be properly appreciated and under-
stood. Shakespeare’s tragedies, for instance, include comedy – a fact 
that challenges the distinction between tragedy and comedy that has 
been upheld since Aristotle (FHA 2, 525). However, given that the 
aims of Shakespeare’s drama differ from those of Greek tragedy, there 
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is no reason to abide by the Aristotelian understanding of tragedy in 
order to judge Shakespeare’s work. 
 A further important difference between Greek tragedy and 
Shakespearean drama is the origin of their dramatic form, the source 
from which they drew their inspiration. While the Greeks drew 
on the dithyramb, mimed dance and the chorus (FHA 2, 500; SWA 
292; see also SW 16, 100), Shakespeare drew on history (FHA 2, 508; 
SWA 298; see also FHA 2, 525; see also SW 16, 101). For this reason, 
Shakespeare’s plays are themselves a presentation of history. Thus, 
Herder writes, “in Othello,” we have before us a “ living history of 
the genesis, development, eruption, and sad end to the passion of 
this noble and unfortunate man !” (FHA 2, 511; SWA 300). The Greek 
tragedian was, by contrast, no historian, and his genius did not lie 
in his ability to draw on historical events. For this reason, Herder 
argues that the origin or inspiration of a work of art must be taken 
into account when we judge its value. In other words, genius must be 
measured differently – Shakespeare’s genius is a different kind than 
the one exhibited by the Greek tragedian. 42 
 What then is the genius of Shakespeare? According to Herder, 
it is not unlike the genius of a historian. For it has to do with 
Shakespeare’s ability to assemble the various characters, estates, 
and ways of life into a meaningful whole. Shakespeare “embraces 
a hundred scenes of a world event in his arms, orders them with a 
gaze, and breathes into them the one soul that suffuses and animates 
everything,” Herder writes, echoing not only the aim of the his-
torian but also that of the natural historian (FHA 2, 511; SWA 300). 
As Buffon put it in the  Premier Discours , “one can say that the 
love and study of nature presuppose in the spirit of the investigator 
two qualities that are opposed: the grand view of an ardent genius, 
who embraces everything in one glance [ embrasse tout d’un coup 
d’oeil ], and the detailed attention of a laborious instinct that does 
not attach itself to any one point.” 43 Shakespeare’s genius lies in 
this two- fold ability, of noting every detail and ordering them with 
one glance. 
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 While contemporaries may have been similarly inspired by the 
emerging historical consciousness and the increasingly differentiated 
world they inhabited, Shakespeare was able to  present this multi-
valent world on stage in a  coherent way. Thus despite the highly 
differentiated set of characters, locations, and events, Shakespeare’s 
dramas display a unity, and it is in this that Shakespeare’s genius lies. 
Herder thus locates Shakespeare’s genius  in relation to his time and 
place. Shakespeare’s distinctiveness is not sought in either an a priori 
criterion (for instance, one that accords with Aristotle’s account 
of tragedy ), nor is it sought in a merely particularizing account of 
Shakespeare, i.e., in a character sketch or vignette, that fails to place 
Shakespeare in his time, and thus fails to see where his genius lies. 
The fi rst approach (the approach assumed by the French) moves from 
the universal or a priori to the particular. In so doing, it overlooks or 
denies the particularity of the particular. The second approach, by 
contrast, focuses entirely on the particular, and thus fails to rise above 
the particular. Though the two approaches seem opposed, they share 
one important commonality: neither is able to mediate between the 
universal and the particular – neither is able to “embrace a hundred 
scenes” and “order them with a gaze.” 44 
 Herder’s wording is telling here; as with Buffon, the emphasis 
is on both multiplicity and unity, on a hundred scenes and one gaze 
[ mit dem Blick ]. The implication is that the interpreter of a work 
of literature must proceed by reading each part after the other, i.e., 
linearly. The work, however, extends in many directions: each of its 
parts is in dialogue not only with the part that preceded it or the one 
that comes after it, but also with the opening as well as with the 
closing acts, for instance; the same holds for the characters, whose 
relations are not limited to those characters with whom they appear, 
etc. Thus although the reader proceeds sequentially, the meaning 
of the work, and the signifi cance of each scene, cannot be grasped 
simply through a sequential reading. At the end of the reading, the 
interpreter realizes what unifi es the various parts (which is not 
simply their sequential ordering), and must go back and consider 
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every scene, every act, and every character’s words, in light of this 
unity. The reader must, in other words, re- present the parts, which 
are apprehended sequentially, non- sequentially, i.e., as partaking in 
and contributing to a multi- directional and meaningful whole. The 
reader must therefore fi nd in the sequence a non- sequential unity, a 
unity that is not determined by the way in which we apprehend the 
work (or nature), but that nonetheless determines each part of the 
sequence. Of course, the work of interpretation is never completed. 
The reader must continue to move back and forth between the parts, 
and revisit her interpretation in light of a deeper understanding of 
the connections between the various parts, and of the ways in which 
they portray the whole from a different angle. 
 This hermeneutic circle, which Herder develops in his essays 
on literary and artistic interpretation, is, I believe, the basis for his 
parallel notion of a “circle” or a “world” that he introduces in his 
essay on language in order to explicate differences between animals, 
and between animals and humans, and that he goes on to invoke in 
the  Ideen in order to explicate the relations between species, and 
between species and their natural environment. 
 HERDER’S NOTION OF A CIRCLE OR WORLD 
 Herder’s notions of a circle or a world may have been inspired by 
Buffon’s notion of “climate.” 45 In contrast to climate, however, 
Herder’s understanding of a circle takes account not only of tem-
perature and geography, but also of the ways in which an animal (or a 
human) refl ects and is refl ected in its (his or her) world. A circle, for 
Herder, is not simply an external cause that effects the development 
of a species, but an inhabited world, which must be understood  in 
relation to its inhabitants and vice versa. Every essential aspect of a 
world must be taken into account, because through understanding 
this world, we understand its inhabitants, and through understanding 
its inhabitants, we understand it. Herder’s “world,” like the world of 
an author, does not simply affect its inhabitants (i.e., the author), but 
is also infl uenced by them. Put differently, a world does not have a 
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solely uni- directional impact, but is a complex reality that refl ects its 
inhabitants as much as it is refl ected in them. 
 As noted, Herder fi rst articulated his notion of a “circle” or a 
“world” in his essay on the origin of language and thus in response to 
the question posed by the Berlin Academy. Herder’s aim in the essay 
was to develop a naturalistic account of the origin of language that 
resolved the difficulties faced by the naturalist positions of Condillac 
and Rousseau. It was Rousseau who fi rst articulated these difficul-
ties. In his  Discourse on the Origin of Inequality , he noted that 
while human languages are artifi cial, and involve a certain amount 
of arbitrariness and convention, natural (i.e., animal) language does 
not. 46 Yet, if human language emerged from natural language, then, 
Rousseau surmised, it is necessary to explain this transition, this 
jump from the one to the other. Lacking any such explanation, it was 
not evident how a naturalistic account could be sustained. 47 Herder 
responds to this difficulty by following a different path than the one 
taken by Rousseau . 
 Rather than conjecturing an imagined past (as Rousseau had 
done), Herder begins by observing and describing what is before him, 48 
with the aim of answering the question: what is it like to be human, 
and what might it be like to be animal? The fi rst striking character-
istic of the human being, he notes, is the fact that the human is “far 
inferior to the animals in strength and sureness of instinct, indeed … 
he … lacks what in the case of so many animal species we call innate 
abilities for and drives to art [ Kunsttriebe ]” (FHA 1, 711; HPW 77– 8). 
Animals, by contrast, are born with specifi c strengths and capacities, 
which refl ect and are refl ected in their natural environment. There is 
an intimate reciprocity between the animal and its context, such that 
its abilities map onto what Herder calls the animal’s “circle [ Kreis ].” 
He writes: “ Each animal has its circle to which it belongs from birth, 
into which it immediately enters, in which it remains all its life and 
in which it dies.” This circle corresponds to the animal’s inborn cap-
acities: “the sharper the animals’ senses are, and the more marvelous 
the products of their art, then the smaller their circle is, the more 
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limited in kind the product of their art” (FHA 1, 712; HPW 78). There 
is an inverse proportion between the animal’s capacities (its “drives 
and arts”) and its circle:  the larger the circle, the less defi ned, the 
less focused and distinct the capacities; the smaller the circle, the 
more defi ned and focused the capacities. This is evident in the case 
of bees, for instance, whose circle is the beehive; within the beehive, 
their “drives and arts” are a display of precision and efficiency. Once 
the bees exit the beehive, however, their distinctive and focused cap-
acities, which are perfectly suited for the beehive, place them in a 
precarious position. Their capacities, so attuned to the beehive, are 
inversely unfi t for the non- beehive environment. The same, Herder 
notes, obtains for other insects, such as the spider, whose “world” is 
its web, and whose capacities are perfectly attuned to this world – but 
hardly beyond it. 
 When considering those beings whose “circle” is much wider, 
the opposite appears to be the case. In contrast to bees and spiders, 
animals that roam, for instance, are far less focused, their capacities 
are not as clearly determined for or by their very specifi c context. 
This leads to a general decrease in the power and efficiency of their 
senses in relation to their surroundings. As Herder puts it, “on the 
other hand, ‘ the more numerous the functions and the destiny of 
the animals are, the more dispersed their attention is over several 
objects, the less constant their manner of life is, in short, the larger 
and more diverse their sphere is, then the more we see their sensu-
ousness distribute itself and weaken ’ ” (FHA 1, 712; HPW 78). This 
dispersion of attention and weakening of the senses is most clear, 
Herder continues, in the case of the human, who lacks a circle or spe-
cifi c context altogether. The human being does not live in any one 
environment, but can inhabit a multitude of geographic contexts, 
and this is connected to the fact that human capacities are far less 
focused and not at all shaped or molded by needs that are specifi cally 
relevant to a particular context, or a particular function. Thus Herder 
goes on, “The human being has no such uniform and narrow sphere 
where only a single sort of work awaits him; a world of occupations 
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and destinies surrounds him.” For this reason, “His senses and organ-
ization are not sharpened for a single thing; he has senses for every-
thing and hence naturally for each particular thing weaker and duller 
senses” (FHA 1, 713; HPW 79). 
 The difference between humans and animals, then, has to do 
with the human lack of a specifi c circle, and with what that entails in 
terms of innate capacities. In contrast to animals, humans lack “dir-
ection,” which means that the human being has “ no drive to art, no 
skill for art  – and, one thing which is more especially relevant here, 
 no animal language .” In other words, the human being, in contrast 
to animals, is not born with innate capacities that fi t its environ-
mental needs; the human being, one can say, suffers from a poverty 
of innate skills, one of which is animal language. Thus while animals 
certainly have language, as Herder notes, their language is something 
with which they are born; it is an instinct. By contrast, humans 
lack innate skills, including animal language. This is the real diffe-
rence, according to Herder, between humans and animals, and it is 
the reason why human language differs from animal language. The 
former is not instinctual; it must be acquired, or as Herder puts it 
“invented” (FHA 1, 722; HPW 87). 
 By focusing on context, and seeing the animal and the human 
in relation to its context, Herder is able to maintain a naturalistic 
account of language, that is, an account that does not rely on divine 
origins, without, however, succumbing to the difficulties faced by 
Condillac’s and Rousseau’s positions. By invoking the notion of a 
circle or a world, and seeking to understand the individual animal 
in relation to its world, to its lived environment, Herder is doing 
nothing less than “explaining the one through the other,” i.e., seeing 
how the context is refl ected in the individual animal and, in turn, 
how the individual animal contributes to its context. By moving 
back and forth between the animal and its circle, Herder discerns 
an indelible unity and reciprocity between the two, and, in this way, 
begins to recognize important differences between various animals 
and between humans and animals. These differences are not based on 
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an a priori account, or a general perspective, nor are they based on the 
mere accumulation of data. Rather, the differences emerge through 
hermeneutic work, through seeing the parts in their relation to the 
whole and, in turn, seeing how the whole is manifest in the parts. By 
relying on this methodology, Herder does not need to offer a conjec-
tural history of humanity, nor does he need to account for a “jump” 
from natural to artifi cial language. Rather, Herder’s methodology 
allows him to focus on what is before him, and locate meaning  – 
an indelible unity or reciprocity – in and through what he sees. 
 While Herder’s introduction of the notion of a world provides 
a solution to the question concerning the origin of language, its sig-
nifi cance goes beyond the 1772 essay. Herder invokes the notion of 
a world in the  Ideen , where he seeks to develop a natural history of 
humanity, which commences with a natural history of non- human 
nature. In seeking to understand the structure of birds, for instance, 
he does not focus on one aspect of its structure, nor does he get lost 
in its various aspects. Instead, he focuses on the relation between the 
structure of the bird and its environment, its world. “The bird fl ies 
in the air,” such that “every divergence of its form from the build of 
land animals can be explicated through its element.” By contrast, 
“The fi sh swims in water; its feet and hands are grown into fi n and 
tail: it has only little articulation of its members” (FHA 6, 75– 6). 
 Just as in the language essay, so here Herder sees an integral 
connection between the animal and its environment. The rela-
tion is, importantly, not merely superfi cial. Herder’s point is that 
the animal’s  very structure , its build [ Bau ], is in dialogue with its 
environment, such that this structure both serves its environmental 
needs and is served by its environment (FHA 6, 73). Furthermore, 
for Herder, recognizing the ways in which the bird is in dialogue 
with its context, and comparing it to fi sh and terrestrial animals, is 
an important means by which to discern how the bird both differs 
from and reiterates the structure of other animals. In other words, 
by grasping the bird in its environment, and comparing the relation 
between its structure and environment to that of the fi sh and other 
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animals, one begins to understand not only the bird’s relation to 
its environment, but also the bird’s relation to other animals, and 
thereby discern both their differences and similarities, and thus glean 
a continuity in nature that does not imply identity. 
 CONCLUSION: HERDER’S HERMENEUTICS OF NATURE 
AND ITS IMPACT 
 Herder has been credited with providing a more “dynamic” view of 
nature, a view that ultimately led to the foundation of geography as 
a discipline in the nineteenth century. 49 Such a dynamic perspective 
implies, above all, a relation of reciprocal determination between the 
natural world and its inhabitants. While this perspective was most 
comprehensively carried out by Alexander von Humboldt, my claim 
is that Herder’s notion of a world – developed through his hermen-
eutic theory and practice – played an essential role in the develop-
ment of dynamic natural history. It is thus not surprising to recognize 
a fundamental affinity between Herder and Humboldt’s aims. 50 What 
distinguishes Herder and Humboldt from their predecessors is their 
disinterest in classifi cation, and by contrast, their interest in grasping 
a “world,” an inhabited reality that is refl ected in the very struc-
ture of its inhabitants. This enabled both of them to move beyond 
superfi cial descriptions of climatic infl uence to the view that the 
natural world is an effecting and effected reality, transforming and 
transformed by its inhabitants. Or, to conclude with Humboldt’s 
own words:
 I was passionately devoted to botany, and certain parts of zoology, 
and I fl attered myself that our investigations might add some 
new species to those which have been already described; but 
preferring the connection of facts which have been long observed 
to the knowledge of insulated facts, although they were new, the 
discovery of an unknown genus seemed to me far less interesting 
than the observation of the geographical relations of the vegetable 
world, or the migration of social plants, and the limit of the 
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height which their different tribes attain on the fl anks of the 
Cordilleras. 51 
 Notes 
 1  This is evident, for instance, in the recent special issue of the history of 
science journal  Isis which focuses on the infl uence of the humanities 
on the development of the natural sciences . Rens Bod and Julia Kursell, 
eds., “The History of Humanities and the History of Science,”  Isis 106 
(2015): 337−40. 
 2  In their article on the history of science and the history of philology, 
Lorraine Daston and Glenn W. Most disagree with “current ways 
of conceptualizing the history of science and the history of the 
humanities,” which “have imposed anachronistic divisions among the 
great regions of knowledge and thereby obscured commonalities that are 
deeper, broader, and more enduring than this or that case study about 
specifi c instances of interaction, infl uence or borrowing would suggest.” 
Lorraine Daston and Glenn W. Most, “History of Science and History of 
Philologies,”  Isis 106 (2015): 381−2. 
 3  As Daston and Most put it: “philological practices of grammatical 
analysis, collation and comparison of texts, glosses and commentaries, 
indices and tabulations, and perhaps most signifi cant of all, detection 
and correction of all manner of inconsistencies in form and substance, 
were (and in some cases, still are) the foundation for many scientifi c 
practices, especially in medicine and natural history.” Daston and Most, 
“History of Science,” 384. 
 4  Brian Ogilvie, for instance, argues that the work of comparing texts 
in the Renaissance infl uenced the work of comparing fl ora and 
fauna and developing taxonomies. Brian Ogilvie,  The Science of 
Describing: Natural History in Renaissance Europe (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2006). Similar research has been undertaken to 
demonstrate the signifi cance of note- taking practices in philology and 
the emergence of “fi eld work” in natural history in the Early Modern 
Period. See Ann Blair, “The Rise of Note- taking in Early Modern 
Europe,”  Intellectual History Review 20 (2010): 303−16. 
 5  Not all eighteenth- century scholarship on this topic is recent, though the 
majority is. Two exceptions are Peter Reill ’s 1992 article on historical 
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thought in Germany and Great Britain, which offers a large brush- 
strokes account of the development of natural history, arguing that it 
must be understood in relation to the development of historical thought 
more generally. Peter Hanns Reill, “Buffon and Historical Thought in 
Germany and Great Britain,” in  Buffon 88 , ed. Jean Gayon (Paris: Vrin, 
1992). Hans- Dieter Irmscher ’s 1984 article on Herder ’s philosophy of 
history notes Herder ’s use of biological metaphors to describe historical 
phenomena, but does not consider whether Herder ’s methodology 
refl ected insights gained from natural history. Hans- Dietrich Irmscher, 
“Grundfragen der Geschichtsphilosophie Herders bis 1774,” in 
 Bückeburger Gespräche über Johann Gottfried Herder 1983 , ed. Brigitte 
Poschman (Rinteln: Bösendahl, 1984). 
 6  This recent work strongly contrasts with earlier approaches to 
historicism . See for instance, Friedrich Meinecke,  Historism: The Rise 
of a New Historical Outlook , trans. J. E. Anderson (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1972 [1936]). Though in his 1992 article Peter Reill 
(see n. 5 above) emphasizes the mutual infl uence of the natural and 
the human sciences , his earlier book on historicism does not. Peter 
Hanns Reill,  The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). For more recent 
work which at least acknowledges the role of the natural sciences in 
the development of historicism, see Frederick Beiser ,  The German 
Historicist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 6−10 
and John Zammito , “Philosophy of History: The German Tradition 
from Herder to Marx,” in  The Cambridge History of Philosophy in the 
Nineteenth Century (1790−1870) , ed. Allen W. Wood and Songsuk Susan 
Hahn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Beiser ’s changing 
perspective on the relation between historicism and natural science 
epitomizes these changing attitudes. While in a 2007 article he argues 
that there is a difference in kind between the methods of the historical 
and natural sciences, in his 2011 book on historicism, he notes that now 
he “reject[s] this distinction.” The reasons are twofold. First, very few 
historicists regarded the methods of history as distinct from those of the 
natural sciences. And second, Beiser claims, “historicism  grew out of a 
naturalistic program in the Eighteenth Century,” namely the attempt to 
create a “science of man” by applying Newtonian laws and methods to 
history (Beiser ,  The German Historicist Tradition , 3, note 5, and 6). 
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  7  Though one can argue that historicism and hermeneutics are very 
closely associated, maybe even identifi able (as Gadamer claims), 
I follow Beiser who distinguishes the two because many historicists 
were not hermeneutic thinkers, and many hermeneutic thinkers did 
not aim to formulate a general theory of history (Schleiermacher, for 
instance). Beiser ,  The German Historicist Tradition , 10. Furthermore, 
studies of historicism have generally not focused on the hermeneutic 
tradition, leading to this lacuna. 
  8  See for instance Thomas M. Seebohm,  Hermeneutics: Method and 
Methodology (Dodrecht: Kluwer, 2004). 
  9  Gadamer is generally uninterested in examining scientifi c practices , 
and more interested in philosophizing about science more generally. 
Furthermore, his account of the emergence of hermeneutics is largely 
one- sided, identifying, for instance, romantic hermeneutics with 
the “aesthetic attitude,” which Gadamer rejects in favor of his own 
version of universal hermeneutics. Gadamer ’s unreliable history 
of hermeneutics should thus not serve as a guide to its historical 
development. See Kristin Gjesdal ,  Gadamer and the Legacy of German 
Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). For an account 
of positivist and post- positivist science, see John Zammito ,  A Nice 
Derangement of Epistemes: Post- Positivism in the Study of Science 
from Quine to Latour (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
 10  Michael Forster ’s chapter on Herder ’s philosophy of language, which 
also considers Herder ’s hermeneutics, is a case in point. Forster notes 
that for Herder there are deep and intrinsic methodological similarities 
between the interpretation of historical texts and scientifi c research. 
Forster ’s chapter does not, however, consider the ways in which 
Herder employs or develops scientifi c methodology in light of his 
hermeneutics, or the extent to which Herder ’s scientifi c knowledge 
(and his sources) may have infl uenced his hermeneutics. Rather, 
Forster simply emphasizes a methodological parallelism between the 
two. Michael N. Forster ,  After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the 
German Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 45−50 
and 140−1. 
 11  See Rudolf Makkreel,  Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The 
Hermeneutic Import of the Critique of Judgment (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1990). Though Makkreel is mostly interested in 
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the fi rst part of the  Critique of the Power of Judgment , he does claim 
that Kant’s notion of teleological judgment is part and parcel of the 
larger hermeneutic/ interpretive work developed earlier in the book, 
making note, for instance, of the fact that for Kant the idea of life has a 
descriptive as opposed to explanatory role, which is what makes Kant’s 
method –  pace Makkreel – hermeneutic. See esp. 99−103. 
 12  On the reasons for Kant’s rejection of the use of refl ective judgment 
in science , and how he differs in this regard from Herder , see 
my “Understanding as Explanation: The Signifi cance of Herder 
and Goethe’s Science of Describing,” in  Herder: Philosophy and 
Anthropology , ed. Anik Waldow and Nigel de Souza (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 106−24. 
 13  What Kant designates as “proper science,” in contrast to “improper 
science.” For an account of this distinction, see my “Analogy, 
Natural History, and the Philosophy of Nature: Kant, Herder and the 
Problem of Empirical Science,”  Journal of the Philosophy of History 9 
(2015): 240−57, esp. 251−3. 
 14  On the “liberalization” of the sciences, see John Zammito ,  Kant, 
Herder and the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2002), 222−3. Zammito is following Sergio Moravia , who argues 
that it was through this liberalization that anthropology emerged as a 
distinctive fi eld. Sergio Moravia, “The Enlightenment and the Sciences 
of Man,”  History of Science 18 (1980): 247−68. Stephen Gaukroger ’s 
account of the “collapse” of seventeenth- century mechanical- 
mathematical philosophy demonstrates the reasons for this opening 
up of science , and the ways in which various thinkers responded to 
this opening up (above all, through the proliferation of new scientifi c 
disciplines and objects of study). Stephen Gaukroger,  The Collapse of 
Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility: Science and the Shaping of 
Modernity 1680−1760 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
 15  Though modern hermeneutics is often identifi ed with Schleiermacher , 
Herder is now recognized as a leader in hermeneutic thought and a 
major infl uence on Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics and Romantic 
hermeneutics more generally. On Herder ’s infl uence on Schleiermacher, 
see Forster ,  After Herder . On his infl uence on the Romantics, see 
Michael N. Forster ,  German Philosophy of Language: From Schlegel to 
Hegel and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). According 
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to Forster , it is impossible to imagine Romantic hermeneutics 
(including Schleiermacher’s) without Herder . 
 16  Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon ,  Histoire naturelle, générale 
et particulière (36 vols.) (Paris: L’Imprimerie royale, 1749−1778), vol. 1 
(1749), 20. All references to the  Histoire naturelle will be abbreviated 
( HN ), followed by a volume number, date and page. 
 17  Buffon ,  HN 1 (1749), 16. 
 18  For an account of Buffon ’s distinction between “real” and “abstract” 
truths , see Philip Sloan, “Buffon , German Biology and the Historical 
Interpretation of Biological Species,”  The British Journal for the History 
of Science 12 (1979): 109−53. 
 19  Buffon ,  HN 1 (1749), 30. 
 20  See Philip Sloan, “The Buffon- Linnaeus Controversy,”  Isis 67:3 
(1976): 356– 75; here: 370. 
 21  Buffon ,  HN 14 (1766), 22−3. Quoted in Jacques Roger,  Buffon: A Life in 
Natural History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 293. 
 22  An earlier version of the  Pensées was published in late 1753 under the 
title  De l’interprétation de la Nature ; however, the book as it is known 
today was published in early 1754 under the new title. 
 23  Denis Diderot,  Pensées sur l’interprétation de la Nature (Paris, 1754), 
6, paragraph II;  Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature and Other 
Philosophical Works , trans. Lorna Sandler (Manchester: Clinamen 
Press, 1999), 35. 
 24  Diderot,  Pensées 18−19, paragraph IV;  Thoughts , 37−8. 
 25  Diderot and Buffon also emphasized the role of the imagination in 
grasping whole objects. See Jessica Riskin,  Science in the Age of 
Sensibility: The Sentimental Empiricists of the French Enlightenment 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 98, 210−11. On the 
importance and widespread use of analogy in eighteenth- century life 
science , see Peter Hanns Reill ,  Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005). 
 26  Buffon ,  HN 1 (1749), 50−1. 
 27  Buffon ,  HN 7 (1758), 22. 
 28  Buffon famously claimed in the  Histoire naturelle that “a series of 
like facts or, if you wish, a frequent repetition and an uninterrupted 
succession of the same events , make up the essence of physical 
truth : what one calls physical truth is thus no more than a probability, 
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but a probability so great that it equals certainty .” Buffon ,  HN 1 
(1749), 55. 
 29  Zammito ,  Kant, Herder and the Birth of Anthropology , 229. 
 30  See Eugen Sauter,  Herder und Buffon (Rixheim: F. Sutter & Cie, 1910), 
6−11. Sauter ’s account of the relationship is, however, missing the fi rst 
reference Herder makes to Buffon , namely in his 1768 essay on Thomas 
Abbt (Sauter claims that the fi rst mention is from the 1769  Journal 
meiner Reise ). Furthermore, Sauter maintains that it was through 
Hamann that Herder became familiar with Buffon . While this may 
be true, given the popularity of the  Histoire naturelle and its German 
translation (by Abraham Gotthelf Kästner in 1760), Herder may have 
come to Buffon through other sources. 
 31  Zammito,  Kant, Herder and the Birth of Anthropology , 332. 
 32  FHA = Johann Gottfried Herder ,  Werke in zehn Bänden , ed. U. Gaier 
et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985– 1998). 
 33  HPW =  Herder : Philosophical Writings , ed. and trans. Michael 
N. Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
 34  On the infl uence of food and climate on the degeneration of species, 
see Philip Sloan, “The Idea of Racial Degeneracy in Buffon’s  Histoire 
naturelle ,”  Studies in Eighteenth- Century Culture 3 (1973): 293−321. 
Thanks to Jennifer Mensch for directing me to this article. 
 35  According to Jacques Roger, Buffon ’s notion of “climate” changed over 
the years, such that by 1775, it denoted temperature alone. Roger, 
 Buffon , 415. 
 36  Buffon ,  HN 4 (1753), 215. 
 37  Roger,  Buffon , 178; Sloan, “Racial Degeneracy,” 307−9. 
 38  A similar point has been made by Chenxi Tang , who argues that 
Herder ’s view of nature as “a dynamic system of forces” strongly 
contrasts with “a static surface lending itself to schematic description 
in the manner of Bergman, Buffon , and other descriptive geographers.” 
Chenxi Tang,  The Geographic Imagination of Modernity: Geography, 
Literature and Philosophy in German Romanticism (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2008), 108. 
 39  Herder employs the same methodology in speaking about the natural 
world in  Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit . Thus 
he writes that in order to understand connections between species and 
varieties, the natural historian must “explain the one through the other 
[ Ein Exemplar das andre erkläre ]” (FHA 6, 73). 
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 40  SWA = Herder ,  Selected Writings on Aesthetics , ed. and trans. G. Moore 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
 41  SW =  Johann Gottfried Herder Sämtliche Werke , ed. B. Suphan et al. 
(Berlin: Weidmann, 1882– 1909). 
 42  For a more comprehensive account of the main differences between 
ancient Greek and Shakespearean tragedy according to Herder , see 
Forster ,  After Herder , 172. See also Herder ’s critique of Winckelmann’s 
assessment of ancient Egyptian and ancient Greek sculpture. According 
to Herder , Winckelmann ’s account fails to recognize a fundamental 
difference in the aims (and thereby in the genre) of Greek and Egyptian 
sculpture, precisely because it is divorced from the culture in which the 
respective sculptures emerged. As Forster notes, Winckelmann does not 
only fail in his interpretation of these works, but also in his valuation of 
them. Forster ,  After Herder , 173−5. 
 43  Buffon ,  HN 1 (1749), 4. 
 44  For a detailed account of how Herder ’s hermeneutics mediates between 
these two (insufficient) approaches, see Kristin Gjesdal ,  Herder’s 
Hermeneutics: History, Poetry, Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017). 
 45  See Sauter,  Herder und Buffon , 22−3. 
 46  As Avi Lifschitz notes, Rousseau identifi ed three main challenges with 
the naturalistic account, including the problem of how convention can 
be achieved without consent, which requires speech. See Avi Lifschitz, 
 Language and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth 
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), esp. 78−80. 
 47  As Lifschitz recounts, “Rousseau’s exasperation at the difficulties 
posed by the human invention of language became a focal point for 
conservative authors, from Beauzée to de Maistre,” and ultimately 
led to Süßmilch’s argument for the divine origin of human language. 
Lifschitz,  Language and Enlightenment , 79; see also 83−7. 
 48  His intention is made explicit when he states that, unlike previous 
philosophers who have sought but failed to offer a causal explanation 
of various human and animal capacities, his aim will be to offer 
“observations [ Bemerkungen ]” which can at least “throw much light on 
the doctrine of the human soul” (FHA 1, 712; HPW 78). 
 49  On the emergence of “dynamic” natural history and its infl uence 
on modern geography , see Tang,  The Geographic Imagination of 
Modernity ,  ch. 1 . Tang maintains that Herder was the fi rst to contribute 
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to the dynamization of natural history (108). Eugen Sauter similarly 
claims that Herder played an important role in the emergence of 
modern geography, above all through infl uencing the geographer Carl 
Ritter. Sauter,  Herder und Buffon , 88. 
 50  Otto Heller, one of Humboldt’s fi rst biographers, describes the relation 
between Herder and Humboldt in the following way: “What Herder 
had enthusiastically attempted in the ‘Outlines of a philosophy of 
the history of mankind,’ Humboldt wants to do scientifi cally in 
‘Kosmos’: to connect the development of the culture of the human 
race to its native soil.” Quoted in Nicolaas A. Rupke,  Alexander von 
Humboldt: A Metabiography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008), 71. Hanno Beck , another Humboldt biographer, contends that 
the title of Humboldt’s  Ideen zu einer Physiognomik der Gewächse 
(1806) comes from Herder ’s  Ideen . Hanno Beck , “Kommentar,” to  Ideen 
zu einer Physiognomik der Gewächse by Alexander von Humboldt 
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989), 287−328. 
Annette Graczyk also claims that Humboldt’s notion of a “general 
physical geography of plants” originates in Herder ’s statement, in the 
 Ideen , that his goal is to develop a “general botanical geography of 
human history.” Annette Graczyk,  Das literarische Tableau zwischen 
Kunst und Wissenschaft (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2004), 290−1. 
 51  Alexander von Humboldt and Aimé Bonpland,  Personal Narrative of 
Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of America, During the Years 1799– 
1804 , vol. 1, trans. and ed. Thomasina Ross (London: Bohn, 1852), x. 
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